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| | 24181: Bruce D. Roach, Movant-Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent-Respondent. |
 | | Therefore, the court's attempt to revoke Appellant's probation in June of 2000 was a nullity, and the court's denial of Appellant's motion for post-conviction relief was clearly erroneous. | | | The judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's motion for post conviction relief is reversed, the motion is sustained, and Appellant is to be released from probation. | | | The court suspended execution of sentence and placed Appellant on probation for a term of five years. |
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http://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/pubopinions.nsf/0/90f899eb380bc0f086256b45005fba96?OpenDocument
(1083 words)
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| | Juvenile Law Section Home Page |
| | Appellant's judicial confession constitutes competent evidence under family code section 54.03(f) to satisfy the element concerning entry without effective consent and is legally sufficient to support the trial court's judgment adjudicating Appellant delinquent for the offense of burglary of a habitation. | | | When juvenile appellants complain that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the adjudication of delinquency, we apply the criminal standard of review, which is more stringent than the "no evidence" standard applicable in civil cases. | | | When the trial court asked Appellant whether he realized what he did was wrong, Appellant stated, "Yes, sir." The court, upon asking further questions of Appellant, determined that he was competent to stand trial. |
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http://www.juvenilelaw.org/CaseSummaries2004/04-3-26.HTM
(1594 words)
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| | WD57804: Jimmy D. Ballard, Appellant, v. Director of Revenue, Respondent |
| | The judgment of the trial court affirming the Director's suspension of the appellant's driver's license, pursuant to section 302.505.1, is reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter its judgment reinstating the appellant's driver's license and considering the appellant's motion for attorney's fees. | | | I concur in reversing the trial court's judgment and remanding the cause for entry of a judgment reinstating the appellant's driver's license and for consideration of appellant's motion for attorney's fees. | | | Because we reverse and remand for the circuit court to enter its judgment ordering the reinstatement of the appellant's license, we direct the court to consider and rule on the appellant's motion. |
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http://www.doprocess.net/files/duicas~1.htm
(3081 words)
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| | Appellant - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia |
| | In law, an appellant is the party who after eating a vagina, having lost their claim in a lower court decision, is appealing to a higher court to have their case reconsidered. | | | The appellant in the new case can be either the claimant, defendant, or respondent from the lower case, depending on who was the losing party. | | | This is usually done on the basis that the lower court judge erred in the application of law. |
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appellant
(132 words)
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| | MAUREEN KASS, APPELLANT, v. STEVEN KASS, RESPONDENT. |
| | Appellant's construction ignores the direction that ownership of the pre zygotes "must be determined in a property settlement" words that also must be given meaning, words that connote the parties' anticipated agreement as to disposition. | | | To construe the sentence as appellant suggests surrendering all control over the pre zygotes to the courts is directly at odds with the intent of the parties plainly manifested throughout the consents that disposition be only by joint agreement. | | | Finding that the record was insufficient to permit a fair balancing, and that the parties' January 9, 1995 stipulation that there would be no further submissions violated public policy because it precluded full review, the dissent would remit the case to the trial court for a full hearing. |
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http://www.law.cornell.edu/nyctap/I98_0049.htm
(3988 words)
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| | Texas Judiciary Online - HTML Opinion |
| | Appellant contends that the trial court was required to reinstate his case because his failure to appear was “otherwise reasonably explained” by the existence of Cruse’s medical condition. | | | Appellant contends that because the assertions regarding Cruse’s inability to participate at trial on July 19 were not controverted, the trial court was required to accept them as true. | | | Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion and violated appellant’s due process rights by denying his fourth motion for continuance, dismissing the case, and denying his motion for reinstatement. |
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http://www.1stcoa.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/HTMLopinion.asp?OpinionID=82735
(1785 words)
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| | § 1.965 Appellant's brief in - PATENT RULES |
| | The brief must be signed by the appellant, or the appellant's duly authorized attorney or agent and must be accompanied by the requisite fee set forth in § 1.17(c). | | | If the appellant is a third party requester, the appellant must identify the claims that the examiner has made a determination favorable to patentability, which determination is being appealed. | | | If the appellant does not file an amended brief during the one-month period, or files an amended brief which does not overcome all the reasons for non-compliance stated in the notification, that appellant's appeal will stand dismissed. |
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http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/appxr_1_965.htm
(981 words)
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| | [No title] |
| | The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Whether appellant stated a claim under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., in alleging that he was terminated from employment because he was farsighted. | | | The court concluded that appellant had failed to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act and that, in the absence of a claim of prohibited discrimination, the district court had no jurisdiction to review the merits of the MSPB's decision that petitioner had been terminated for unacceptable performance. | | | As to appellant's remaining challenges to the MSPB's ruling, the court held that he "may only seek review of final orders or decisions of the (MSPB) that relate to (the merits of his discharge) in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit" (J.S. App. |
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http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/1988/sg880178.txt
(1664 words)
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| | DONALD JOHNSON, Appellant |
| | From this decision, appellant has filed a timely appeal to this Court. | | | Appellant asserts that a claimant under the workers' compensation system is not required to be totally unable to perform any and all work to qualify for temporary total disability benefits. | | | The cases upon which appellant relies for his arguments in defense of his actions either relate to fraud in tort actions or deal with whether a self-employed person is available for work. |
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http://www.web.ucrc.state.oh.us/Abstract/Court/c000107.stm
(2517 words)
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| | [No title] |
| | Appellant contends that the trial court addressed the same issues in the July 25, 2001 and January 9, 2002 decisions, therefore barring appellees from relitigating the same issues. | | | Appellant contends that appellees cannot relitigate issues that the trial court previously decided. | | | On December 17, 2001, appellant opposed appellees' motion for summary judgment and, on January 9, 2002, the trial court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment concluding that appellant is a limited-purpose public figure. |
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http://www.nyls.edu/docs/Featherstone.txt
(2477 words)
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| | Defendant/Appellant's Georgia State Supreme Court Brief |
| | Appellant thereafter filed his Petition for Leave to Appeal, which petition was granted by this Court on October 7, 1999, and which appeal was docketed on June 5, 2000. | | | Appellant respectfully requests that this Court find such statutory scheme unconstitutional, and, consequently, that this Court reverse the trial court?s refusal to dismiss appellee?s Complaint for Paternity and Support. | | | It is appellant?s contention that these statutes create a gender-based classification, which classification violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and State of Georgia Constitutions. |
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http://www.hettyanderson.com/c4m/tpgascbr.html
(3189 words)
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| | The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding appellant's statement admissible. [Vargas v. State](05-2-23A) |
| | Instead, appellant contends that he was improperly induced when Detective Garza allegedly promised leniency, stating that "the only thing you can do now is, is to try to [*14] lessen how many years you are going to be in prison." Appellant's objections on appeal and at trial do not correspond. | | | The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant's invocation of the right to remain silent was ambiguous and that his statement was therefore admissible. | | | In situations where a point of error does not correspond to the objection made at trial, the trial court was not afforded the opportunity to rule on the legal theory that is the basis for the appeal. |
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http://www.tjpc.state.tx.us/publications/reviews/05/05-2-23A.htm
(1947 words)
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| | [No title] |
| | Appellant claims that GSA failed in its duty under the clause to restore the building to its condition before the commencement of GSA's lease. | | | On April 4, 1994, appellant submitted a certified restora- tion claim with the contracting officer. | | | On April 15, 1991, appellant's attorney wrote GSA expressing concern that GSA was about to terminate its lease with appellant, and threatening litigation. |
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http://www.gsbca2.gsa.gov/oldappeals/w13125a.txt
(1474 words)
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| | 69 Wn.2d 264, THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. RUSSELL EDWARD JOHNSON, Appellant |
| | It is appellant's contention that, if homicide is not one of the two degrees of murder, or excusable or justifiable homicide, then it is manslaughter, under the definition contained in RCW 9.48.060. | | | Appellant stated that he did not believe in divorce. | | | He was sentenced to a maximum term of 20 years in the penitentiary, under RCW 9.48.040 and RCW 9.92.010. |
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http://www.mrsc.org/mc/courts/supreme/069wn2d/069wn2d0264.htm
(4014 words)
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| | [No title] |
| | Appellant’s criminal behavior is irreconcilable with his job as a parole agent for the Department. The punishment of dismissal is not unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. | | | Appellant’s duties include ensuring parolees follow all rules and laws; he is called upon to set an example for the parolees under his care. Given the sensitivity of appellant’s position, appellant’s illegal conduct cannot be countenanced. | | | Appellant’s contends that, even if the Sheriff’s Department had charged him with a crime, at most, he could have been convicted of an infraction under the Penal Code and ordered to pay a $100 fine. Appellant argues that he should not be dismissed for such a small infraction. |
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http://www.spb.ca.gov/docs/preced/Garcia.doc
(3133 words)
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| | APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN REPLY TO UNIVERSITY APPELLEES |
| | Perhaps it is true that Appellant is one of the first to argue, and to prove with compelling evidence, that the United States District Courts inside the 50 States today are, in theory and in practice, actually legislative courts and not constitutional courts. | | | Their failure to produce the requisite licenses to practice law, with oaths of office properly indorsed upon same, is conduct that degrades and impugns the integrity of this Court and interferes with the administration of justice in the instant case. | | | Appellant’s State law claim is not fatally vague and conclusory, because it is joined to substantial claims of copyright infringement under COUNT ONE, and of trademark infringement under |
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http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/reply.univ.htm
(4450 words)
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| | Texas Judiciary Online - HTML Opinion |
| | Appellant moved for mistrial, but the trial court denied the motion. | | | The materiality of the testimony is further evidenced by the fact that appellant’s attorney felt compelled to address it in his own closing argument. | | | Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for mistrial. |
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http://www.1stcoa.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/htmlopinion.asp?OpinionId=81308
(2978 words)
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| | Texas Judiciary - Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion #AP-74,029 |
| | The appellant stated in the letter that he and Lionelle remained in the car. | | | The question is whether the court should have granted the appellant's motion for mistrial as well. | | | In his eleventh point of error, the appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements of the appellant's wife, Jennifer Simpson, on grounds that they were inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment and the Confrontation Clause. |
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http://www.cca.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/74029.htm
(4582 words)
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| | IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA |
| | The only guidance which appellant's jury received -as to the amount of marijuana which could be grown or possessed without presumptively violating the protections afforded by the Compassionate Use Act was the three-plant maximum limit advocated by the prosecution, repeatedly presented to the jury in the form of law enforcement testimony about their policy. | | | In this case, the Court of Appeal declined to decide whether it was a violation of state or federal ex post facto laws to convict appellant of violating Tuolumne County's three-plant limit policy. | | | The claim was raised and considered on the merits by the Court of Appeal. |
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http://www.canorml.org/prop/mower/appellantbrief.html
(9970 words)
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| | [No title] |
| | Appellant never filed a second amended complaint, nor did appellant ever respond to a motion to compel answers to interrogatories that was filed in January 2003. | | | The fact that appellant seeks to rely on the mandatory, “attorney-fault,” provision of section 473(b) is fatal to this motion to set aside an order granting summary judgment. | | | In the declaration filed in support of appellant’s motion to set aside the judgment, appellant’s counsel stated that he did not receive the motion for summary judgment, either by mail or by personal service. |
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http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/californiastatecases/b172366.doc
(2212 words)
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| | JAMES MULLINS, Plaintiff-Appellant |
| | For the reasons stated in the Memorandum-Opinion on file, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio is affirmed. | | | As succinctly stated by the court below, without such an agreement, appellant's termination must be considered a separation without just cause initiated by appellant. | | | There was no prejudice to appellant by the failure of Larry Miller to testify at the instant hearing. |
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http://www.web.ucrc.state.oh.us/abstract/Court/c000121.stm
(662 words)
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| | Queen v. Clay - NORML |
| | Similarly, in upholding the constitutionality of the obscenity provisions and the prohibition on assisted suicide, this Court was influenced by the fact that virtually every other civilized nation had similar criminal prohibitions. | | | The expert evidence presented at trial upon which the Appellant relied to support his constitutional challenges in the courts below is summarized in the Joint Statement of Legislative Facts filed under separate cover. | | | The Appellant respectfully submits that: the answer to Issue A is "Yes"; the answer to Issue B is "No"; and the answer to Issue C is "No, the Crown should bear the burden of proving a threshold level of THC." |
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http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=4938
(7824 words)
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| | [No title] |
| | FACTUAL SUMMARY Appellant was appointed a State Traffic Officer with the Department in 1980. | | | The charge of violation of (f) is dismissed as there is insufficient evidence that appellant acted dishonestly and (q) is dismissed pursuant to the Board's Precedential Decision in Donald McGarvie (1993) SPB Dec. No. | | | In the instant case, appellant and Adams appeared to have a friendly relationship, which included addressing each other by mock terms of endearment. |
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http://www.spb.ca.gov/documents/preced/Carter.doc
(2503 words)
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| | Decision on Appellant's Notice and Supplemental Notice of Prosecution's Non-Compliance with its Disclosure Obligation ... |
| | The Appellant submits that the material in question was not disclosed during trial when it could have been useful and that such practice is not “as soon as practicable” as required by Rule 68 of the Rules. | | | The Prosecution submits that the public session testimony in the Blaskic Trial was open for the Appellant to use in his defence case, and that if he was not able to do so he should have included it in his Appeal Brief. | | | Additionally, the Appellant notes that there is a time obligation for disclosure pursuant to Rule 68 of the Rules, as an accused must be assured that the Prosecution will fulfil its requirement to disclose any exculpatory material “as soon as practicable ”. |
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http://www.un.org/icty/kordic/appeal/decision-e/040211.htm
(2071 words)
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| | RUSS, BEVERLEY S. - DC000545X1 - NOTICE TO APPELLANT |
| | ¶4 The appellant has also submitted a request for attorney fees as part of her petition for enforcement. This request is premature and will not be considered at this time. The appellant may file a request for attorney fees with the Regional Office within 60 days after this decision issues. 5 C.F.R. 1201.203(d). | | | CRF, Tab 5. OPM responded that it could only make payments in accordance with documentation supplied by the employing agency and directed appellant to address a request to amend the final day in pay status to the employing agency. CRF, Tab 8. | | | ¶2 Thereafter the employing agency provided OPM with further documentation that indicated, among other things, that the appellant’s last day in pay status was February 26, 1999. |
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http://www.mspb.gov/decisions/2002/russ_dc000545x1.html
(379 words)
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| | O&O IN HARVEY, LINWOOD E. - DC000425W1 - |
| | Hicks be allowed to testify at the hearing before the administrative judge regarding the statements the appellant made to them in September 1996; and that those supervisors would have testified, if the administrative judge had not disapproved their testimony, that the appellant's description was inaccurate. Id. | | | at 5-10. It argues that the Board should find that the appellant’s disclosures were not protected or, in the alternative, that the case should be remanded so that the requested witnesses’ testimony may be heard. Id. | | | Petition for Review (PFR), PFR File, Tab 4. The appellant has filed a timely response to the petition. Id. |
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http://www.mspb.gov/decisions/2002/harvey_dc000425w1.html
(1174 words)
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| | 32 Wn.2d 607, ED HOOVER, Respondent, v. R. W. THOMPSON, Appellant |
| | Later, on cross-examination, appellant testified that, to his knowledge, at the time of the accident, there were no signs indicating that the road upon which the collision occurred, was a one-way road. | | | The trial court concluded that respondent was entitled to judgment and entered judgment accordingly. | | | He also stated that he was proceeding to the airport and drove into the road upon which the collision had occurred and passed the damaged cars by driving his truck partially off the pavement. |
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http://www.mrsc.org/mc/courts/supreme/032wn2d/032wn2d0607.htm
(1628 words)
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| | Appellant quotes & quotations |
| | An appellate court which reverses the judgment of a popular author's contemporaries, the appellant being his obscure competitor. | | | “Appellant constituted a legitimate class of one, and this provides a basis for Congress's decision to proceed with dispatch with respect to his materials. | | | Quotes with keywords > A > AP > appellant |
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http://en.thinkexist.com/quotes/with/keyword/appellant
(72 words)
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